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Abstract: This paper, through an analysis and constitutional point of view, will clarify the 
constitutional position of the President that he has in parliamentary republics. This will be possible by 
reflecting the principle of separation of powers, its philosophy and its attitude toward the role of the 
head of state in parliamentarianism. The starting point of this writing is the analysis of the separation 
of powers and the impact of this principle on the democratization of countries. The reports that the 
President has with the Assembly will be addressed in this article in particular. Moreover, we will 
address the specifics that point out the role and position of the President in the Parliamentary 
Republic. Also, addressing the veto of the president as an institution that affirms the balancing power 
of the Assembly will prove its special position within the system itself. Kosovo, its constitution and 
its principles will be an inseparable part of this paper. The Republic of Kosovo has embraced the 
principle of the separation of powers, and has established a typical parliamentary system of 
government whereby the President has reserved a neutral position among all other powers. 
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1. Introduction  
The clear placement of positions and roles of powers in a governing system 
becomes possible only through the principle of separation of powers. Determining 
the role of the president (head of state in general, whether monarch or president), 
depends largely on his constitutional position in the landscape of separation of 
powers. 
The principle of separation of powers is one of the first principles of antiquity in 
the attempt to establish democracy in the fight against the absolute form of political 
regulation (Saliu, 2004, p. 297), by its very significance, always reveals an 
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actuality (Cadart, 1990; Omari, 2012, p. 63). The principle of the separation of 
powers represents a constitutional value by which the principle of legal certainty of 
citizens is first guaranteed, avoiding the arbitrariness of power. “The principle of 
the separation of powers is one of the basic principles on which the rule of law 
functions and one of the fundamental principles on which democracy functions” 
(Gruda, 2015, p. 13). 
The separation of powers is based on one another’s positioning of the three main 
branches of power, legislative, executive and judiciary. As a matter of principle, it 
has an organizational character (Zaganjori, Anastasi & Cani, 2011, p. 28) and the 
three state bodies function as separate from one another in the exercise of their 
powers (Omari, 2012, p. 110). 
The principle of separation of powers is embodied as a result of the struggle for 
freedom and the removal of arbitrary powers to non-controlled and non-restricted. 
As such, in historical terms, it has changed its role depending on the social and 
political circumstances of the time. Although it is a principle that dates back to 
Aristotle1 (Omari, 2012, p. 61), in the sense that it has today, originally, dates only 
from the ideas of thinkers like Locke and Montesquieu, and others in their era. 
Their ideas were against the tyranny and uncontrolled power of the monarchs of 
the time. Thus, the limitation of the power of the state chief of time marked the 
starting point of this principle. Through this limitation, some of the power had to be 
transferred to people where their power was confounded in the legislative power. 
Eventhough, Locke believed that the principle of separation of powers would 
soften arbitrariness by the government (in this case the monarch as head of state), 
he failed to conceive that the powers were placed in the horizontal line so he did 
not see them as equal. It was not even against that the powers were all in an 
individual. He, unlike others, thought the powers were four, and not three or two 
(Omari, 2012, pp. 61-62). 
As said above, through the mechanism of control and balance of powers, greater 
assurance is obtained in the first instance of the individual freedom of the citizens 
and their equality, because, as Montesquieu expressed, “an eternal experience 
shows that every man who has power is destined to misuse it, he goes so far as to 
find limits ... In order not to abuse this power, the power must stop power” 
                                                             
1 Aristotle, the principle of the separation of powers, did not conceive as a principle where separate 
bodies, separated from each other, perform certain work, but he understood this principle only as an 
exercise of state activity in various forms. In his mind, the three powers conformed to a single figure 
(the principle of unity of power). 
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(Montesquieu, 2000). Montesquieu, presents another thinker who was against the 
absolute power of the time. According to him, political freedom would be when the 
three areas of exercised authority will respond to three powers (Midgaard, 2007, p. 
307). If one power intervenes in another power or they unite, as would be the case 
when the senate and state chief co-ordinate the law, then it is at risk of producing 
tyrannical laws (Midgaard, 2007, p. 307). 
One thing is clear, despite the efforts to limit arbitrariness, this did not happen in 
Locke and Montesquieu's time. Their ideas were limited to the first modern 
constitutional acts such as the US constitution. Also, the separation of powers, both 
seen as a division of legislative activity by the head of state rather than an 
organization in three forms of power. Moreover they did not at all count the 
Judiciary as part of the powers. The only way to limit the power of the monarch 
was seen by a collegial body that would be choosen by the people, which had the 
form of a congregation known as the Parliament. 
These ideas led to the concept of parliamentary monarchies, later constitutional 
ones, and governance systems in the form of democratic republics. The principle of 
the separation of powers today does not imply a rigorous, even rigid, division of 
the functions exercising powers, in fact it means a division which lies between their 
control and their counterbalance. Despite the changes that the principle of 
separation of powers has undergone in its composition and understanding, it 
remains the same today without which there is no freedom and democracy (Omari, 
2012, p. 64). 
The principle of the separation of powers has been embraced by most of the 
democratic countries of the world, including post-communist ones in the group of 
which Kosovo is part (without exception from other Balkan countries which were 
part of the former Yugoslav Federation). Constitutional norms in these countries of 
the principle of separation of powers, besides the organizational role, are more 
viewed as a form and opportunity not to return to the dictatorships that have 
passed. In the Republic of Kosovo, this principle is found in its constitution, 
namely article 4, which states that the country is a democratic republic based on the 
separation and control of the balancing of powers. The legislative power is 
exercised by the Assembly, the executive Government and the judiciary is 
independent. The President represents the unity of the people by representing the 
country inside and outside and guaranteeing the democratic functioning of the 
institutions (Constitution of Kosovo, 2008, article 4). An expression in this way of 
this principle is important for the interpretation that will be made to the constitution 
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in various cases in order to avoid situations that would lead to the mixing of 
powers of power (Hasani & Cukalovic, 2013, p. 29). 
From the reading of the Article it is noted that the President of the Republic, with a 
separate paragraph (and below in the constitution and with a separate chapter), 
definitively determines that he under no circumstances presents the Head of State 
as the executive carrier. In this paper, we will raise the issue between the 
parliamentary report and the head of state focusing on the competencies that the 
latter has in relation to the first. Understanding of his role, his position and the 
power of his competencies is done in the light of the review of the first constitution 
of the parliamentary system, which comes as a result of the principle of separation 
of powers and then of the President-Parliament report. Its role and nature in the 
parliamentary republics, like Kosovo, for many reasons is special. 
 
2. The Position of the President in the Parliamentary Republics 
Insofar posed above, the definition of the role of a president in a state depends 
largely on how he has chosen to govern the state by taking as a criterion the 
principle of separation of powers. In this regard, three types (systems) of 
governance are known: the parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential 
system. In the light of the principle of the separation of powers, a system takes on 
the given epithet, depending on the dominant powers that one of the organs has and 
which consequently occupies the central place in that system. These models of 
government exist even when it comes to determining the constitutional position of 
the president within the state. 
Most new democracies, especially those born after the fall of dictatorships in the 
1990s, have chosen to belong to the so-called parliamentary republics. Thus, the 
central role in the exercise of institutional-political life has given parliament or, in a 
more generalized language, their representative assemblies. The parliamentary 
system, presents the model of governance based on the principle of the separation 
of powers, where this principle, in this system, does not appear in a strict form as in 
the presidential system (Bajrami, 2010, p. 90). The relations between the powers 
are regulated by a balancing mechanism between them, each of which 
independently exercising its power, and mutually controlled by each other. In terms 
of the role of the head of state and his position towards the representative body, 
debates about the parliamentary system initially develop into the role parliament 
has towards the government as executive power. This is because in countries where 
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the head of state is the bearer of executive policies, ie in presidential or semi-
presidential systems where executive powers divide together with government, 
parliament as a legislative body and power has lost its legislative power over 
executive power as a perpetrator (Della Porta, 2006, p. 184; Pring, 1972). In this 
regard, in these countries, the president has competences that make him central to 
the state and determines the pattern of governance. 
In the parliamentary system of government, the head of state has a more specific 
role. Apparently, for such typical systems, it is believed that the president has an 
entirely ceremonial role where he is just a “formal leader (puppet) and executive 
power is owned by a prime minister and/or council of ministers” (Heywood, 2008, 
p. 320). Exercising his duty in ceremonial form and his agreement with some 
constitutional powers are two features that characterize him in the parliamentary 
republics (Hasani & Cukalovic, 2013, p. 380). The type of competencies he exerts 
and the way of his choice determine his role in a system (Hasani & Cukalovic, 
2013, p. 381). 
Consequently, the system of governance and the role of the president in the 
republic can not be determined solely by taking into account one element and 
leaving the other apart. A president may be elected by the people and be called to 
popular legitimacy but, if his powers are faded, it can not be said that he represents 
a presidential model of governance. So, a combination between his powers and the 
way of his election determines his role in the republic. There is no doubt that the 
mode of his election is decisive for his political power (Hasani & Cukalovic, 2013, 
p. 384), even when elected by the parliament, the way of voting what size is 
required is very important (Hasani & Cukalovic, 2013, p. 384), but his position in 
the triangle of separation of powers depends “essentially on the extent of the 
executive powers that he/she has” (Hasani & Cukalovic, 2013, p. 384). 
Based on the factors mentioned above, the Kosovo president, who is elected by 
parliament and exercises a number of competencies defined by the constitution, has 
a striking role for the parliamentary republics, which is the representation of the 
unity of the people as the head of state (Constitution of Kosovo, 2008, article 83). 
This power gives the president of the country greater independence from other 
powers and places him in a position over/outside the other powers (Vorpsi, 2006). 
In fact, the power derived from article 84.2 of the constitution, which gives the 
president the right to guarantee the constitutional functioning of the institutions, 
clearly presents the role of representation of the unity of the people, his position in 
the triangle of the separation of powers. Through this competence, the country’s 
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president stands in a neutral position but not in the role of an executive power. The 
representation of popular unity best resembles its position in the state and its 
juridical nature.1 
In post-communist countries and new democracies, the position of the president as 
a neutral power, dependent on the way of parliamentary election, but also with a 
range of competencies, divided or co-ordinated to him and other institutions, 
guarantees the removal of a president tyrannical with absolute power. 
Concentrating power on a single individual, in terms of the role of the president, in 
countries that do not have a high democratic culture would jeopardize the normal 
functioning of institutional life and democracy in general. 
However, the competences of the President of the Republic of Kosovo cover a 
wide range of actions, and seemingly go beyond those of presidents elected by the 
people (Reka, 2012, p. 107). In cases where these competences are in relation to 
the assembly, we can divide them into two types: the competence which activates 
the work of the Assembly by the President and the competence that 
inhibits/corrects the work of the Assembly. Both powers are such that they 
basically have the principle of controlling and balancing the powers. 
In the first competency, what is called the legislative competence of the president 
derives from article 79 of the Constitution by which he, in his scope, has the right 
to propose laws in the assembly. Such a competence, by some scholars, is not seen 
respecting the principle of separation of powers and makes the president to be 
active on the political scene, which contradicts his neutral position (Omari, 2009, p. 
28). 
The second competency relates to what is called the use of veto-returning to a re-
examination of a law approved by the Assembly. This competence, in the case of 
Kosovo, is at the discretion of the president and does not go beyond other typical 
parliamentary models. 
  
                                                             
1 For the role of the president in the parliamentary republic, the Constitutional Court also spoke in the 
Judgment on cases KO.29 / 12 and KO.48 / 12, date 1 July 2012, no. AGJ 284/12. Also, regarding the 
nature of the head of state, brought under the great debate between Schmitt and Kelsen, see: 
Prof.dr.Enver Hasani, Abstracts and Preventive Controls (Preliminary) of Constitutional Amendments 
and Protection from Discharge of Head of State: Kosovo Case,  Magazine: ”Law”, No. 1/2013. 
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3. Constitutional Reviews on Presidential Veto 
In a parliamentary system, maintaining the neutral position of the head of state is 
regulated by various constitutional mechanisms. This neutral position, set on other 
powers, does not make the president a completely ceremonial figure where he has a 
competence such as representing the unity of the people and guaranteeing the 
constitutional functioning of the institutions. These two competences challenge the 
president to any other institution take a role that will have a balancing and 
controlling nature in order to avoid any arbitrariness and overcoming the 
competencies to the detriment of the citizens and the country. 
In places where the president is elected by parliament, but has the above mentioned 
competencies, the report between them is not so much divided. This is due to the 
fact that the president has been guaranteed some powers that hold in a way the 
control over the work of the assembly, but it is understood not so unreservedly. 
Such competence is also the exercise of veto. 
The word veto has Latin origin which means to stop, block, reject something 
(McLean, 2009). As such, in the legal and political language, it is most often used 
in the sense of the competence of the head of state to stop or reject the approval of 
a law approved by the assembly. In the constitution, for the first time, it is placed in 
the US constitution as a defense mechanism to stop the lawmaking activity from 
interfering in the affairs and controlling the president’s work. Without the 
possibility of a full separation between the powers in the papers, he saw the 
president's use of the veto as sufficient to balance his report with the assembly. 
Also, it serves not only as a shield of the president of the assembly but also serves 
in removing non-constitutional texts from the laws (Federalist Letters, No. 73). 
Such a look at the right to use veto is more rigorous because of its own governing 
system of the presidential type. In parliamentary systems there is a shortage of this 
institute in its own content as well as in its use. 
In Kosovo, and other parliamentary republics, where the role of the president is 
placed in a neutral position, veto right serves to carry out essential constitutional 
functions. It enables the president to participate in the legislative process as a 
representative of the unity of the people and secondly, to have an active role in 
constitutional debates within the country (Morina, 2014, p. 28). The role of the 
veto of the president is also seen as a mechanism for safeguarding the 
constitutionality of legislation regardless of whether the presidents are elected by 
the people or are the result of a vote in the Assembly (Morina, 2014, p. 28). 
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Although the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo does not use the term veto, it 
recognizes such competence for the country’s president. In its Article 84.6 it states 
“it has the right to return for review of approved laws if it considers it to be 
harmful to the legitimate interests of the Republic of Kosovo or one or more of its 
communities. The right to return a law can only be used once” (Constitution of 
Kosovo, 2008, article. 84 par. 6). Reading this article gives us a clear picture of the 
content of this right and how it is used. The content of this competence appears to 
be wide since the president has the right to use it for “the legitimate interests of the 
Republic of Kosovo or one or more communities” which decides in full discretion 
on its use, in particular when dealing with the first part “legitimate interests...”. 
As such, the competency is presented in the form of a suspensive veto but with 
characteristics of the typical parliamentary model of governance (Hasani & 
Cukalovic, 2013, p. 397). The use of this power by the president implies 
controlling a law both by the procedure and by its content. Therefore, in the 
materialization of this competence acts as a representative of the unity of the 
people in his political and ethnic sense (Hasani & Cukalovic, 2013, p. 397). 
The constitutional language has followed a logical line of determination of this 
competence as this right to return to review the adopted laws comes as a result of 
the president’s power to announce the laws issued by the Assembly (Constituion of 
Kosovo, 2008, article 84.5 & 80.2). This constitutional requirement for the 
promulgation of assembly laws gives legitimacy, among other things, to the use of 
veto by the president. The constitution, together with the power to restore the law 
under review, has determined the role and the ability of the president in the 
promulgation of laws, states that: 
“2.The law approved by the Assembly is signed by the President of the Assembly 
of Kosovo and is promulgated by the President of the Republic of Kosovo after 
having signed it within eight (8) days after the law has been adopted. 3. If the 
President of the Republic returns the law to the Assembly, he or she must state the 
reasons for the return of the law. The President of the Republic of Kosovo has the 
right to return a law to the Assembly only once. 4. The Assembly, by a majority 
vote of all deputies, decides on the approval of the law restored by the President of 
the Republic, and the relevant law is considered promulgated. 5. If, within eight (8) 
days after the law is adopted, the President of the Republic of Kosovo does not 
make any decision for his promulgation or return, the law shall be deemed 
promulgated without his/her signature and shall be published in the Official 
Newspaper” (Constituion of Kosovo, 2008, article 80.2, 3, 4, 5). 
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Also, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly specify the President’s power to 
announce laws and to return them to the Assembly for reconsideration: 
“2. The law signed by the President of the Assembly is sent to the President of the 
Republic for announcement. 3. If the President of the Republic returns the law for 
reconsideration to the Assembly, the Presidency of the Assembly shall immediately 
send it to the functional reporting committee for review. 4. The functional 
committee only examines the issues contained in the President's decision. Within 
two weeks of work, the commission, from the date of its receipt, submits the report 
to the Assembly with recommendations. 5. The Assembly, by a majority of the 
votes of all deputies, decides on the approval of the recommendation of the 
Committee on the remarks of the President, which, with the amendments approved, 
is considered promulgated. If the Assembly does not approve the commission’s 
recommendation to the President’s remarks, the law remains as previously 
approved by the Assembly and is considered promulgated. 6. If the President of the 
Republic, within the deadline foreseen by law, does not proclaim the law or does 
not return it to the Assembly, the law shall be deemed to be promulgated and 
published in the Official Newspaper of the Republic of Kosovo (Rules of the 
Assembly of Kosovo, 2010, article 61). 
Initially, the right to return a law for reconsideration to the Assembly has been left 
to the President only once because of the fact that it would endanger the balance of 
powers and its constitutional position towards the Assembly if this competence was 
not limited. The sphere of its influence on the work of the Assembly would 
increase if this competence was to be used more than the constitution envisaged. 
However, having only one chance to turn a bad law does not mean that this is set 
for declarations. This competence, if used for its constitutional purposes, would 
enable a stumbling of the arbitrary power of the legislature along with other 
constitutional mechanisms. 
At the stage of returning the law for re-examination in the Assembly, there are two 
important things to be discussed: 
a) The manner of voting the decision (proposals for change in law) of the President 
by the Assembly, and, 
b) Is the proposal for change by the President considered a legislative initiative? 
In the first case, due to the careful reading of the Constitution and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly, there is a controversy between them when it comes to 
voting in the Assembly. Article 80.4 of the Constitution states that the Assembly 
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by a majority vote of all deputies decides on the approval of the law restored by the 
president. Meanwhile, the Rules of the Assembly, under section 61.5 state that the 
Assembly approves the recommendation of the functional committee ie not the law 
but the recommendation of the commission. Thus, the constitution addresses it in a 
full vote, more of the law, while the Rules of the Assembly of the recommendation 
of the functional committee. This is a controversy between the constitution and the 
regulation because the notions used, the law on the one hand and the 
recommendation on the other hand, do not have the same meaning in this 
procedure (Morina, 2014, pp. 35-37). 
The second important issue for discussion is that the proposals for change in the 
law that the President returns are considered a new legislative initiative and how 
far can they extend them? Concerning this issue, the Constitutional Court has given 
a response in its judgment. In its Judgment in the case of “Request of the President 
of the Republic of Kosovo, Mrs. Atifete Jahjaga, with which she contests the vote 
for the adoption of Law no. 04/1-084 “On pensions of members of the Kosovo 
Security Force (Constitutional Court of Kosovo, Case No. KO 57/12, 20 September 
2012)”, the Court was issued in the assessment of the constitutionality of the voting 
for the adoption of Law no. 04/L-oB4 on “Pensions of Kosovo Security Force 
Members” and returned for review to the Assembly of Kosovo with the Decision of 
the President of the Republic of Kosovo. Consequently, the President of the 
Republic of Kosovo addresses the Court to examine whether there has been a 
violation of the Constitution, respectively article 8004, during the voting in the 
Assembly regarding the decision of the President for the return of the law for 
review (Constitutional Court of Kosovo, Case No. KO 57/12, 20 September 2012). 
The country’s president had returned to review the law with some concrete 
proposals made by adding an amendamnet within the law. In the present case, the 
President has not given any reason for changes within the law as it requires Article 
80.3 of the constitution, but she has made an additional amendment. As the 
Constitutional Court notes, the right to convert a law into reconsideration does not 
imply that the president has a legislative right, that is, the right to propose laws 
from its scope governed by Article 79 of the constitution (Constitution of Kosovo, 
2008). Therefore, it is not found in the constitution of Kosovo there is no statement 
that allows the President to make amendments to the law that he returns to review 
(Constitutional Court of Kosovo, Case No. KO 57/12, 20 September 2012), thus 
using this power the president is not allowed to amend the law. On the contrary, 
this would qualify as a mix in the work and legislative activity of the Assembly. 
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Juridically, the effect of using the veto on the part of the President can not go 
beyond constitutional authorizations. The difference in this sense is only the ruling 
model. Where there is a presidential model, it is understandable that its effects are 
greater. In typical parliamentary models where the head of state is defined as a 
representative of the unity of the people by placing it in a neutral position in the 
triangle of the separation of powers, the legal effects of the veto are only those that 
the constitution sanctioned in its text. This has to do with content and number of 
opportunities to use it. Our constitutional language has enabled the President only 
once to use this power for a law, next time he can not do it. This is characteristic of 
most post-communist countries in order to avoid concentration of power in single 
figures such as presidents. However, even in parliamentary models, it is very 
important who is the President. In places where presidents come as a result of 
political coalitions that are also the governing body of the ruling parties, the 
President has a more prominent role in the legislative power and the right to veto. 
In these conjunctures, it can hardly happen to turn the same law back to the 
president who has come from their ranks (their votes in the Assembly). 
 
4. Conclusion 
This article has attempted to clarify the role of the President and his position in the 
states that have for their governing system the parliamentary model. This is done in 
the light of the principle of separation of powers, its content and its adaptation at 
different times. 
The new democracies have encountered problems and major challenges towards 
putting in secure positions of power. Although they have adopted the principle of 
separation of powers in their constitutions, the lack of a democratic and 
institutional culture has made it difficult to realize it in practice. 
In the light of the principle of separation of powers, the President, in parliamentary 
governing bodies, has a neutral position in the triangle of separation of powers. 
Some of them stand on the three powers. This comes as a result of their choice but 
also of their competences foreseen by the constitution. 
Preserving the position and role of the President as a representative of the unity of 
the people has produced various constitutional mechanisms. Among these 
mechanisms are its competences in the legislative activity of the Assembly. Among 
the most important is his right to review the adopted Assembly laws in order to 
counterbalance the power of the latter. However, the new constitutions, with a 
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parliamentary system, where Kosovo also belongs, have limited this right to the 
content and the manner of its use with a single purpose: the elimination of any 
attempt to arbitrary and absolute power. 
The use of veto right is not only used for the purpose of removing legal 
irregularities in laws. This competence, in the countries that have elected the 
president from parliament, where he is a fruit of the parliamentary majority, has the 
political role and power to influence and control the work of the Assembly. 
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